

# Risk Intelligence Center

## SITREP: Threats to businesses in the Netherlands surrounding NATO Summit 2025

11 June 2025

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## Methodology

### Approach

The RIC utilizes the information collected from both open-source intelligence (OSINT) and closed sources, such as human intelligence (HUMINT), and is processed and analyzed before final assessment and distribution.

### Threat levels

THREAT LEVELS	
5 – EXTREME	Very high / extreme threat. Review and respond if required.
4 – HIGH	High / major threat. Consider taking appropriate action.
3 – MODERATE	Moderate threat. Maintain awareness, consider precautions.
2 – LOW	Low / limited threat. Be advised.
1 – VERY LOW	Very low / insignificant threat. For awareness.

### Language of probability

The Threat Assessment uses the RIC's language of probability to provide an assessment of the likelihood of a threat manifesting, based on probability, using a percentage, fraction, or ratio as a baseline.

This helps to provide context and clarity and helps maintain a standardized approach.

LANGUAGE OF PROBABILITY							
Term:	Remote	Highly unlikely	Unlikely	Realistic possibility	Likely / Probable	Highly likely	Almost certain
Probability:	0-4%	10-20%	25-35%	40-50%	55-75%	80-90%	95-99%



# SITREP: Threats to businesses in the Netherlands surrounding NATO Summit 2025

## Priority Intelligence

Intelligence Cut Off Date (ICOD)

1300hrs UTC 10 Jun 2025

### ASSESSED THREAT LEVEL

#### 3 – MODERATE

Moderate threat of disruption. Maintain awareness, consider precautions.

- The 2025 NATO Summit will be held at the World Forum in The Hague, Netherlands, from 24-25 June, chaired by NATO Secretary General and former Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte. World leaders and VIPs, including 45 heads of state / government, foreign ministers, and defense ministers from NATO countries, partner nations, and representatives from the EU, are expected to attend.
- The NATO Summit will take place amid an increasingly volatile threat landscape in the Netherlands. Dutch authorities have issued warnings of a high-risk security environment, citing potential dangers such as drone incursions, cyber attacks, disinformation efforts, espionage, and civil unrest. In response, Dutch authorities have implemented extensive security measures.
- Protests have been planned by anti-war and environmental activists in The Hague in the lead-up to and during the summit from 21-25 June, although further actions on the surrounding days and in other locations worldwide are expected. Anti-war activists will hold a 'counter-summit' on 21 June at Koekamp and a rally on 22 June, as well as a 'die-in' protest on the Zuiderstrand on 24 June. Environmental activists also plan to blockade the A12 highway on 25 June.
- Dutch authorities announced that they are preparing for their "*largest security operation in history*," which will include the deployment of ~27,000 police officers across 24-26 June, supported by ~5,000 armed forces personnel and special forces teams on 24-hour standby. The government also requested additional support from police forces in Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and the UK.
- The Risk Intelligence Center (RIC) assesses that the NATO Summit is likely to pose a MODERATE threat to businesses in the surrounding area due to public disruption caused by heightened security measures and protest activity in the lead-up to and during the event. Heightened security measures are almost certain due to the presence of world leaders and VIPs, potentially mitigating the likelihood of most threats; however, the possibility of unannounced protests / threat incidents causing further unexpected disruptions to businesses cannot be ruled out.

# SITREP: Threats to businesses in the Netherlands surrounding NATO Summit 2025

## Overview

The 2025 NATO Summit is scheduled to take place at the World Forum in The Hague, Netherlands, from 24-26 June, chaired by NATO Secretary General and former Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte. World leaders and VIPs, including 45 heads of state / government, foreign ministers, and defense ministers from NATO countries, partner nations, and representatives from the EU, are expected to attend. The summit is expected to focus on several critical issues shaping the alliance's future, with defense spending and ongoing support for Ukraine likely to be at the top of the summit's agenda.



**The Summit is expected to attract some ~9,000 attendees, including 45 heads of state / government.**

**(Source: government.nl)**

A major point of discussion, amid growing controversy, centers around the push for higher defense spending by member states. While NATO previously agreed in 2023 that each member should allocate at least 2% of its GDP to defense (a target currently met by 22 of 32 members), new proposals aim to go further. The US has called for each NATO member to raise their defense spending to 5% of GDP, a move that has sparked debate among allies due to concerns over fiscal sustainability and national priorities.

Rutte proposed that 3.5% of GDP should be allocated to traditional defense spending ("hard defense") and an additional 1.5% to broader security areas, such as cybersecurity, by 2032. The proposal reflects growing recognition of evolving security threats; however, it faces some resistance from member states wary of the increase. The summit is also expected to address the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, with discussions on continued financial and military support, resource commitments, and Ukraine's potential future membership with NATO.

The increasingly fragmented and unstable political landscape in the Netherlands has created more complex conditions for negotiations ahead of the summit, following a major domestic political upheaval that has left Prime Minister Hendrikus 'Dick' Schoof serving in a caretaker role, with restricted authority to implement new policies until a new coalition is established.

Although the Dutch government has reaffirmed its commitment to hosting the 2025 NATO Summit, the timing of the political collapse raises concerns about the country's capacity to engage in key discussions on security and defense matters. The political volatility is also likely to intensify the overall threat environment, increasing the likelihood of politically motivated protests in the lead-up to and during the summit.

The NATO Summit will take place amid an increasingly volatile threat landscape in the Netherlands. Dutch authorities have issued warnings of a high-risk security environment, citing potential dangers such as drone incursions, cyber attacks, disinformation efforts, espionage, and civil unrest. In response, the Netherlands has implemented extensive security measures and requested additional support from police forces in Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and the UK.



**The Netherlands' hosting of the conference was promoted via the 'NATO and the Netherlands: A Journey' tour of Dutch cities ahead of its commencement.**





















**(Source: government.nl)**






# SITREP: Threats to businesses in the Netherlands surrounding NATO Summit 2025


## Threat intelligence

### Recent threat incident map



Incident type			
	Flood		Vehicle incident
	Landslide		Cyber
	Hurricane / Tornado		Fire
	Severe Weather		Infrastructure
	Travel & transport		Disease / illness
	HAZMAT		Protest & Unrest
	Explosive incident		Military
	Public safety / security		Maritime
	Crime		Other
	Violent crime		Incident cluster

Incident threat levels	
	Extreme threat incident.
	High threat incident.
	Moderate threat incident.
	Low threat incident.
	Very low threat incident.



Map shows threat incidents reported in / around the Hague in June, as well as notifications of planned protests during the NATO Summit.

(Source: RIC Alerting Service)



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## Protest and unrest



The Netherlands has a heightened protest landscape, with regular protest actions, including those related to climate activism, and the Gaza-Israel and Russia-Ukraine conflicts. Protest actions are most common in cities and urban areas, including Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and The Hague. Most actions take place peacefully; however, some escalations have been reported during previous large-scale actions, with authorities also reporting to have arrested protesters in some cases.

NATO Summits have previously been subjected to protests with demonstrations typically focusing on the climate crisis, the Gaza-Israel and Russia-Ukraine conflicts. The 2024 NATO Summit in Washington, DC, US, triggered large-scale protests / demonstrations of hundreds of people who conducted daily rallies outside the summit venue, following a 'counter-summit' ahead of the event. The protest also involved pro-Palestinian narratives, indicating the crossover of activist motivations being observed globally. Similar actions also occurred in 2023 and involved anti-NATO protests in several European countries.

An alliance of organizations and anti-war activist groups under the banner of the 'Counter-Summit Coalition for Peace and Justice' and the 'No-NATO War Summit' movements is planning a weekend of protest actions from 21-22 June before the summit, with additional unconfirmed actions expected in the days surrounding the summit.

The Dutch Counter-Summit Coalition for Peace and Justice is composed of several organizations, including but not limited to the Revolutionary Socialist Party, BDS-NL, De Nieuwe Vredesbeweging, XR Justice Now!, and Stop Wapenhandel. The groups published an itinerary for the planned actions, although it is expected that other groups, including pro-Palestine / anti-war, pro-Ukraine, and environmental activists, will join or organize their own actions in association with the NATO Summit.

Authorities have acknowledged the likelihood of civil disruptions, including small-scale protests, and have designated areas near the World Forum summit venue to accommodate such gatherings. However, event organizers stated that larger demonstrations will be directed to the Malieveld in central The Hague, commonly used for public assemblies.

Notable protest activity surrounding the summit includes (but is not limited to):



Poster for the counter-summit organized by several activist groups.  
(Source: [Tegentopcoalitie.nl](https://tegentopcoalitie.nl))

Date	Event	Description
21 June	Activist counter-summit	Anti-war / anti-NATO activists will hold a 'counter-summit' at Koekamp (Laan van Reagan and Gorbachev) to begin their weekend of actions before the NATO Summit is due to start. The agenda lists a series of panel discussions, speeches, workshops, and lectures.
22 June	Protest for Peace and Justice	A protest organized by the Dutch Counter Summit Coalition for Peace and Justice will take place from 1200hrs UTC at Koekamp (Laan van Reagan and Gorbachev). Protesters are encouraged to bring "anti-imperialist and pro-justice" campaign material to the protest.
24 June	"Gaza Beach" die-in	Pro-Palestinian protesters have organized a die-in protest on the Zuiderstrand in The Hague from 1700hrs UTC. Protesters are encouraged to bring Palestinian flags and to wear red for the die-in.
25 June	A12 Blockade	Environmental activists from Extinction Rebellion (XR) Netherlands and XR Justice Now! plan to blockade the A12 highway in The Hague from 1000hrs UTC to protest the perceived prioritization of defense spending during the NATO Summit and demand an end to climate exploitation, the alleged genocide in Gaza, fascism, and racism.

## Advisory

### Tactical / Strategic decision makers (i.e., managers / directors)

To support dynamic decision-making in the event of, or in preparation for, a potential protest-related threat (i.e., to a site, event, or person), the following is a list of tactical options (i.e., management-level planning actions) for security and strategic considerations. This is not an exhaustive list, and organizations should consider organization and site-specific controls and actions relevant to their specific operation.

- Review security and resilience plans, including business continuity plans, crisis management, and crisis communication plans, as well as scenario-specific plans (i.e., for protest / direct action scenarios).
- Consider the implementation of work from home procedures / limiting employee numbers at sites / facilities on the dates of the summit (24-25 June) to limit potential operational continuity challenges in the event of protest actions in the vicinity of high-risk sites and / or assets.
- Consider heightened physical security measures (i.e., security officers, mobile patrols) on / around the summit date at high-risk locations to help deter and detect threat activities, including direct actions and general protests.
- Assess the most likely threat actors for your sector and organization, such as protesters, direct actionists, specific groups, etc, as different threat actors will have different motivations and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). Identifying any potential threats can help detect security vulnerabilities.

### Operational (i.e., security operations)

The following is a list of operational options and planning actions for security in the event of, or in preparation for, a potential protest-related threat (i.e., to a site, event, or person). This is not an exhaustive list, and organizations should consider organization and site-specific controls / actions relevant to their approach.

- Maintain awareness of recent activist tactics and upcoming flashpoints in the immediate term, as these can be indicators of the threat that upcoming actions can have. Often, unannounced actions will occur at major international summits, and their threat can be mitigated by understanding likely activist tactics.
- Ensure any responses to protest actions from security teams are appropriate and justified to reduce the likelihood of escalations and potential reputational damage, which would likely result if the responses were viewed as forceful or excessive.

## Crime and terrorism



The threat of crime in the Netherlands is generally considered to be low, with The Hague also experiencing low crime levels; however, the average of total crimes is higher in the city, where some non-violent crimes do occur. Violent crimes against foreign visitors are rare, with petty crimes occurring more commonly. The most common types of criminal activity include petty theft, burglary, pickpocketing, and shoplifting. Transportation hubs, including Schiphol airport and Amsterdam Central Station, and high tourism areas generally tend to experience higher crime rates due to ease of access and higher concentration of people.

Concerns surrounding threats to business executives when traveling / attending events, have increased substantially following the assassination of UnitedHealthcare CEO in December 2024, with the large volume of high-value targets posing a realistic possibility of threat actor targeting.

The concentration of high-profile and wealthy individuals in / around The Hague during the NATO Summit is expected to create favorable conditions for opportunistic and petty crime, such as thefts and pickpocketing, particularly in areas of high footfall and transportation hubs. While extensive security measures from both public and private sectors will significantly reduce the likelihood of more serious criminal activity in the immediate vicinity of the summit, such risks cannot be entirely ruled out.



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The potential for heightened crime elsewhere across the Netherlands remains realistic due to the redeployment of police resources to The Hague to accommodate the summit. This shift in resourcing is also likely to impact emergency response times elsewhere in the country as assets are concentrated around the event in The Hague, with a likely increase in emergency response times due to essential resources being moved to The Hague.

The threat of terrorism in the Netherlands remains elevated and cannot be ruled out entirely. The Terrorist Threat Assessment Netherlands (DTN) remains at 'Level 4: Substantial' out of a five-tiered scale, indicating that there is a real threat that a terrorist attack will take place in the Netherlands.

The threat level was raised to Level 4 from 'Level 3: Conceivable' in December 2023 following the Gaza-Israel conflict, and backlash over Quran burnings, which have heightened the threat posed by international Islamist and jihadist terrorism to the Dutch government and organizations linked to the Netherlands domestically or abroad.

## Advisory

### Tactical / Strategic decision makers (i.e., managers / directors)

To support dynamic decision-making in the event of, or in preparation for, a potential terrorist-related threat (i.e., to a site, event, or person), the following is a list of tactical options (i.e., management-level planning actions) for security and strategic considerations. This is not an exhaustive list, and organizations should consider organization and site-specific controls and actions relevant to their specific operation.

- Ensure enhanced security measures are implemented at all sites and assets (CCTV, mobile patrols, security officers) to limit potential targeting or damage caused by criminal targeting, either opportunistic or organized crime, including theft, criminal damage, and vandalism.
- Actively monitor threatening incidents through on-the-ground personnel, local news, and social media, and verify any information with official / credible sources. During an incident, the information landscape may be volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA), and all live reports from non-credible sources (i.e., social media / local news) should be taken with caution. An attack may first appear on social media; however, this is prone to misinterpretation and panic.

### Operational (i.e., security operations)

The following is a list of operational options and planning actions for security in the event of, or in preparation for, a potential terrorist-related threat (i.e., to a site, event, or person). This is not an exhaustive list, and organizations should consider organization and site-specific controls / actions relevant to their approach.

- Maintain an awareness of suspicious activity, including people, packages / objects, and vehicles, and contact security or the police if you have any concerns. Any suspicious persons or packages should be reported to authorities immediately.
- Ensure that clear and proportionate controls are in place on information-sharing practices and that all relevant actors (security teams, comms, events, etc.) are aware of their responsibilities to protect critical information and indicators.

## Infrastructure



Power and electricity disruptions in the Netherlands are limited; however, due to the country's growing population and reliance on outdated power infrastructure, power cuts are increasingly likely. The Hague branch of the People's Party for Freedom and Democracy announced that they are increasingly concerned about possible power outages during the NATO Summit, following a large-scale power outage in The Hague in March.

The outage left ~45,000 households in The Hague city center without electricity and resulted in the suspension of trams and cessation of traffic lights; many people also reported a failure of communication facilities.

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In the Randstad region, car users are likely to face disruption in the days leading up to and after the summit, causing delays in deliveries and transport methods. The Rijkswaterstaat announced work from home advice surrounding the summit, and for residents not to travel during rush hour and to use public transport from 23-26 June.

The Schiphol Airport was designated as the arrival and departure point for heads of state, ministers, and delegations ahead of the summit, resulting in adjusted operations in and around the airport. The Polderbaan Runway at the airport will be temporarily unavailable as it will be used for parking for government aircraft. At the same time, the Buitenveldertbaan Runway is out of use for maintenance from 10 May to 28 September, increasing the air traffic using the other runways. These runway closures alongside extensive airspace restrictions will disrupt commercial flights at the airport, resulting in a ~30% reduction in capacity. No restrictions have been reported on the railways; however, trains running from Schiphol Airport are highly likely to be busier, with it a realistic possibility that some train services will be canceled.

Dutch authorities have issued warnings of a high-risk security environment surrounding the summit, citing potential dangers such as drone incursions, cyber attacks, disinformation efforts, and espionage. The Netherlands has experienced a wide range of cyber threats and espionage, including phishing scams, malware attacks, data breaches, sabotage, and disinformation campaigns. Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Netherlands has been increasingly targeted for its support of Ukraine, including in April / May 2025, when various Dutch websites were targeted, including government websites and digital infrastructure, mainly using distributed denial-of-service attacks, with the Russian-affiliated group 'NoName' claiming responsibility for the attack, citing the government's promise of financial support for Ukraine as the motivation.

## Advisory

### Tactical / Strategic decision makers (i.e., managers / directors)

To support dynamic decision-making in the event of, or in preparation for, a potential infrastructure-related threat (i.e., to a site, event, or person), the following is a list of tactical options (i.e., management-level planning actions) for security and strategic considerations. This is not an exhaustive list, and organizations should consider organization and site-specific controls and actions relevant to their specific operation.

- Consult resources provided by Dutch authorities regarding [travel](#) and [transport](#) in / around The Hague to limit possible travel disruptions caused by traffic, demonstrations, and planned maintenance. Check flight status via the [Schiphol Airport](#) website and allow for extra travel time in the event of delays.
- Enhance physical and cyber security posture and ensure readiness for potential direct or indirect threats.
- Ensure crisis and incident response plans are regularly updated and practiced to address infrastructure-related threats, including power outages, cyber attacks, and other forms of sabotage.

### Operational (i.e., security operations)

The following is a list of operational options and planning actions for security in the event of, or in preparation for, a potential infrastructure-related threat (i.e., to a site, event, or person). This is not an exhaustive list, and organizations should consider organization and site-specific controls / actions relevant to their approach.

- Maintain awareness of suspicious activity, including hostile reconnaissance, around critical infrastructure sites, including people and vehicles, and contact security or local authorities.
- Maintain awareness of potential drone usage by threat actors at / around sensitive sites or areas with high footfall. Advise authorities if any incidents are reported at sites.
- Use intelligence capabilities to monitor for any indicators or warnings of a potential threat; ensure that all employees are appropriately trained to identify / report suspicious activity.

## Protective intelligence

### Planned security measures / resourcing



As a result of the summit attracting ~9,000 attendees, including heads of state, ministers, and international delegates, Dutch authorities announced that they are preparing for their “*largest security operation in history*,” which will include the deployment of ~27,000 police officers across 24-26 June, supported by ~5,000 armed forces personnel and special forces teams on 24-hour standby. The government also requested additional support from police forces in Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and the UK. Officers will be stationed in The Hague, at Schiphol Airport, and along transport routes between the airport, hotels, and summit venues. Specialized units, including mobile units, security units, reconnaissance teams, and motorcycle officers, will be involved in escorting delegations and securing key locations.

Other extensive security measures include the deployment of Patriot air defense systems, counter-drone technologies, and patrols by F-35 fighter jets and Apache helicopters. A 22km coastal air exclusion zone will be enforced between the Hook of Holland and Noordwijk. Air traffic restrictions will include a 16km no-fly zone over the Hague from 24-25 June. Softer flight restrictions will apply to the area outside the no-fly zone and within a 93km radius around the World Forum, where commercial flights will require special permits from the government.

Dutch authorities will also introduce restrictions on shipping in the area of the summit from 20-23 June; these will be partial restrictions with only fishermen and excursion boats able to sail with a special permit, and then until 25 June, all maritime activity will be prohibited. The Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management noted that the restrictions will not affect shipping to and from the Port of Rotterdam.

Road traffic restrictions will also be heavily implemented throughout the Randstad region, and in anticipation of major traffic disruptions, the government has warned residents that may temporarily live in a fenced-off area and will encounter security screening to enter or exit, including ID checks or vehicle screenings.



Map showing the latest road closures in the Randstad region from 22-27 June.

(Source: Rijkswaterstaat.nl)



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Partial road closures will also be implemented from 1500hrs UTC on 22 June to 0300hrs UTC on 27 June on motorways in the Randstad region, including the A4, A5, A44, and N44, N440, N434, and N206. Local and regional roads around Haarlemmermeer, Katwijk, Leiden, Noordwijk, Rotterdam, The Hague, and Wassenaar will also be closed, making several areas difficult to reach. Large-scale diversion routes have been imposed.

In addition, central to the summit's venue, Johan de Wittlaan, a major thoroughfare, has been closed since April and will remain inaccessible until August. The closure was implemented to facilitate the construction of temporary structures and security installations. The extended closure reportedly aims to ensure the safety and smooth operations of the summit, but will likely significantly impact local traffic, exacerbating transport disruptions.

## Advisory

### Tactical / Strategic decision makers (i.e., managers / directors)

To support dynamic decision-making in line with, or in preparation for, increased security measures, the following is a list of tactical options (i.e., management-level planning actions) for security and strategic considerations. This is not an exhaustive list, and organizations should consider organization and site-specific controls and actions relevant to their specific operation.

- Prepare for potential site access restrictions across The Hague and the wider Randstad region (including road closures and transit delays).
- Review business continuity plans, especially those involving travel, logistics, and on-site operations.
- Ensure interagency coordination is in place for emergency response operations.
- Coordinate with logistics partners to plan around shipping limitations and permit requirements.

### Operational (i.e., security operations)

The following is a list of operational options and planning actions for security in line with, or in preparation for, increased security measures. This is not an exhaustive list, and organizations should consider organization and site-specific controls / actions relevant to their approach.

- Monitor updates on road / maritime closures and airspace restrictions and adjust logistics accordingly.
- Use intelligence capabilities to monitor for any indicators or warnings of a potential threat; ensure that employees are appropriately trained to identify suspicious activity and report concerns to appropriate authorities.

## Intelligence assessment

Security restrictions and unrest (demonstrations, petty crime, transport delays, operational disruption)				
Threat type:	Security	Operations	Brand & reputation	THREAT LEVEL
Severity:	3 – MODERATE	3 – MODERATE	2 – LOW	3 – MODERATE

The Risk Intelligence Center (RIC) assesses that the NATO Summit is likely to pose a MODERATE threat to businesses in the surrounding area due to public disruption caused by heightened security measures and protest activity in the lead-up to and during the event. Heightened security measures are almost certain due to the presence of world leaders and VIPs, potentially mitigating the likelihood of most threats; however, the possibility of unannounced protests / threat incidents causing further unexpected disruptions to businesses cannot be ruled out.

Protests surrounding the conference are highly likely to attract a large-scale turnout, but are likely to remain largely peaceful. Businesses near The Hague are unlikely to be directly targeted by planned protests, however, it is likely indirect disruptions to operations will occur, and it remains a realistic possibility that more radical activists will escalate the protests to cause heightened disruptions to public mobility, including via property damage or potential clashes with police.

- The primary threat from protests to business disruptions is most likely to stem from the protest / blockade of key road networks, exacerbating disruptions caused by the road closures, although this is likely to be restricted to the specific roads where protests will occur, including the A12.
- There remains a heightened threat of anti-war / pro-Palestinian and anti-NATO activism across Europe while the summit takes place due to NATO's perceived role in international conflicts and tensions, including the Gaza-Israel and Russia-Ukraine conflicts and heightened Middle Eastern tensions, which remains controversial among activist circles and is likely to feature widely in planned protests and potentially provide potential inspiration for protests outside of the Netherlands.
- Businesses that have previously been directly targeted by activists associated with these causes are likely to be at a heightened threat in the period surrounding the summit, as it is likely that groups will seek to exploit the likely heightened attention to their actions in association with the summit. Actions involving criminal damage, vandalism, blockades, or occupations of sites remain a realistic possibility.
- The NATO Summit is almost certain to attract demonstrators seeking to voice their opposition to international policies and the actions of participating member states / world leaders. As the summit will likely announce contentious new policies and initiatives, this further heightens the threat of the summit being targeted by activists who oppose these developments and / or the announcement / occurrence of additional protest actions during or immediately following the summit.

Security measures in the Randstad region are highly likely to cause disruptions to business operations in the affected area, with residents / employees subject to security screening measures to be granted access to the surrounding areas. Organizations also face interruptions to daily activities due to road closures and significant transport delays across the region.

- Non-essential employees who are not required to be at their physical place of work, are likely to be asked to switch to alternate working arrangements, such as working from home or changing working hours, to avoid disruptions or contributing to expected congestion in the city.
- Although a specific map of closures has been produced and communicated to residents via direct contact from authorities, it remains probable that some residents will not be aware of some closures, with potential security incidents arising from this.
- While the authorities aim to minimize disruptions arising from road closures where possible, people in the area surrounding the summit are advised to expect increased traffic on both roads and sidewalks near the World Forum and key roads throughout the city due to widespread closures and diversions.

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While the threat of terrorism is assessed as low due to the levels of security surrounding the summit, the presence of multiple high-profile individuals and increased footfall in The Hague, presents a potential target that has a high level of symbolic value to a threat actor with a realistic possibility that terrorists or extremists will seek to exploit these conditions to carry out an attack.

- The **most likely course of action** would involve a self-initiated threat actor using low-sophistication tactics, such as a knife or shooting attack, or the use of a vehicle as a weapon.
- The **most dangerous course of action** would involve multiple threat actors undertaking a coordinated attack using explosives or other high-impact attack tactics in various locations across The Hague or the Netherlands; however, this is assessed as highly unlikely.
- Terror attacks are often indiscriminate, and organizations can be directly or indirectly impacted as a result of an attack. Indirect impacts on employees, premises, property, or customers resulting from a terrorist attack cannot be discounted.

Although local authorities have already outlined the heightened security measures to be in place throughout the event, individuals in the vicinity of the event are most likely to be impacted by petty and opportunistic crime in these surrounding areas, such as while traveling through the city and on public transport.

- Instances of petty crime are likely to rise immediately before, during, and after the summit as criminals will likely seek to exploit the increased presence of high-profile individuals carrying high-value items, as well as the general increased footfall in the area.
- An increase in cyber attacks targeting essential services / networks during the event remains a realistic possibility, with disruptions likely to impact travel or directly affect the NATO Summit and its attendees to reduce the summit's credibility.
- Disinformation, particularly on social media platforms, will likely be used to sow confusion and undermine confidence in authorities, with the potential for fake security, transportation, or health and safety alerts to be shared. Espionage targeting business attendees is probable as cyber threat actors seek to access confidential information.
- Targeted threats and malicious discourse aimed at business executives are likely to increase in the lead-up to and during the event. Although the likelihood is low, the targeting of UnitedHealthcare's CEO could potentially incite / inspire / influence copycat actions; however, a similar incident at the NATO Summit remains unlikely but cannot be ruled out.



## Advisory

### Tactical / Strategic decision makers (i.e., managers / directors)

To support dynamic decision-making in the event of, or in preparation for, a potential threat event (i.e., protest, crime, terrorism, etc.), the following is a list of tactical options (i.e., management-level planning actions) for security and strategic considerations. This is not an exhaustive list, and organizations should consider organization and site-specific controls and actions relevant to their specific operation.

- Monitor for security updates and potential changes to law enforcement / security operations using social media and local news sources and adhere to any instructions issued by venue security.
- Anticipate heightened policing and security presence in key locations, including transport hubs, religious sites, cultural sites, tourist locations, and high-footfall venues.
- Review security protocols / restrictions put in place by local authorities for the event to ensure minimal disruption to travel and transport before, during, and immediately after the event.
- Review executive protection measures and increase security provisions, including personal protection, secure transportation, and enhanced online privacy measures, particularly following incidents of targeting of business executives.
- Consider work from home procedures / limiting employee numbers at sites / facilities on the dates of the summit (24-25 June) to limit potential operational continuity challenges in the event of protest actions in the vicinity of high-risk sites and / or assets.
- Consult resources provided by Dutch authorities regarding [travel](#) and [transport](#) in / around The Hague to limit possible travel disruptions caused by traffic, demonstrations, and planned maintenance. Check flight status via the [Schiphol Airport](#) website and allow for extra travel time in the event of delays.
- Consider the potential impact of statements or policies regarding politically sensitive subjects, including in relation to the summit, regardless of whether internal or external, which have the potential to result in backlash or direct targeting.
- To control and mitigate the risk of power grid vulnerability, off-grid uninterruptible power supplies (UPS), such as generators, can help maintain the continuity of power during potential outages.

### Operational (i.e., security operations)

The following is a list of operational options and planning actions for security in the event of, or in preparation for, a potential threat event (i.e., protest, crime, terrorism, etc.). This is not an exhaustive list, and organizations should consider organization and site-specific controls / actions relevant to their approach.

- Use intelligence capabilities to monitor for any indicators or warnings of a potential threat; ensure that employees are appropriately trained to identify suspicious activity and report concerns to appropriate authorities.
- Maintain heightened awareness of suspicious activity and indicators / warnings of potential targeting by activists in the lead-up to the summit, such as an increase in targeting through social media, email, or telephone campaigns.
- Ensure that robust security systems and processes are in place for suspicious activity, including intelligence-sharing with security teams, relevant business functions, or external agencies / law enforcement where appropriate.
- When traveling during the event, limit the visibility of organization branding to mitigate any potential targeting.